The European Union plans to beef up its response to, with the Commission saying today it will step up efforts to combat harmful but not illegal content — including by pushing for more minor digital services and adtech companies to sign up to voluntary rules aimed at tackling the spread of this manipulative and often malicious content. EU lawmakers pointed to risks such as the threat to public health posed by the spread of harmful disinformation about as driving the need for more brutal action.
Concerns about the impacts of online disinformation on democratic processes are another driver, they said. Commenting in a statement, Thierry Breton, commissioner for Internal Market, said: “We need to rein in the infodemic and the diffusion of false information putting people’s lives in danger. Disinformation cannot remain a source of revenue. We need to see stronger commitments by Services Act will provide us with additional, powerful tools to tackle disinformation.”, the entire advertising ecosystem, and networks of fact-checkers. The Digital
A new, more expansive code of practice on disinformation is being prepared — and the Commission hopes to be finalized in September to be ready for application at the start of. Its gear change is a fairly public acceptance that the EU’s voluntary code of practice — and approach Brussels has taken since 2018 — has not worked out as hoped. And, well, we did warn them. A on board with demonetizing viral disinformation is undoubtedly overdue. The online disinformation problem hasn’t gone away. Some reports have suggested inappropriate activity — like voter manipulation and computational propaganda — has been getting worse in recent years rather than better.
However, getting visibility into the accurate scale of the disinformation problem advertising industry (i.e., rather than the current handful).given that those best placed to know (ad platforms) don’t freely open their systems to external researchers. But that’s something else the Commission would like to change. Signatories to the EU’s current code of practice on disinformation are: EU lawmakers said they want to broaden participation by getting smaller platforms to join and recruiting all the various players in the adtech space whose tools provide the means for monetizing online disinformation. Today, commissioners said they want to see the code covering a “whole range” of actors in the online
In its press release, the Commission also said it wants platforms and adtech players to exchange information on disinformation ads that have been refused by one of them. So, there’s a more coordinated response to shut out bad actors. As for those who are signed up already, the Commission’s on their performance was bleak. Speaking during a press conference, Breton said that only one of the five platform signatories to the code has “really” lived up to its commitments — which was presumably a reference to the first five in the above list (aka Google, Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft, and TikTok). Breton demurred on doing an explicit name-and-shame of the four others — who he said have not “at all” done what was expected of them — saying it’s not the Commission’s place to do that.
Rather, he said people should decide among themselves which platform giants that signed up to the code have failed to live up to their commitments. (Signatories since 2018 have pledged to take action to disrupt ad revenues of accounts and websites that spread disinformation; to enhance transparency around political and issue-based ads; tackle of its relatively modest social activity versus the rest.)and online bots; to empower consumers to report disinformation and access different news sources while improving the visibility and discoverability of authoritative content; and to empower the research community so outside experts can help monitor online disinformation through privacy-compliant access to platform data.) Frankly, to imagine which of the five tech giants from the above list might be meeting the Commission’s bar. (Microsoft, perhaps, because
There’s been a lot more hot air (in the form of selective PR) on the charged topic of disinformation versus hard accountability from the major social platforms over the past three years. So it’s perhaps no accident that Facebook chose today to puff up its historical efforts to combat what it refers to as “influence operations” — aka “coordinated efforts to manipulate or corrupt public debate for a strategic goal” — by publishing what it couches as a “threat report” detailing what it’s done in this area between 2017 and 2000. Influence ops refer to online activity conducted by hostile foreign governments or malicious agents seeking, in this case, to use Facebook’s ad tools as a mass manipulation tool — perhaps to try to skew an or influence the shape of looming regulations. Facebook’s “threat report” states that the tech giant took down and publicly reported only 150 operations over the reporting period.
As we know from Facebook whistleblower Sophie Zhang, the scale of the problem of mass malicious manipulation activity on Facebook’s platform is vast, and its response to it is both under-resourced and PR-led. (A memo by the former Facebook data scientist, covered by BuzzFeed, detailed a lack of institutional support for her work and how takedowns of influence operations could almost immediately respawn — without Facebook doing anything.) (NB: If it’s Facebook’s “broader enforcement against deceptive tactics that do not rise to the level of [Coordinate Inauthentic Behavior]” that you’re looking for, rather than efforts against “influence operations”, it has a whole other report for that — the Inauthentic Behavior Report! — because, of course, its homework when tackling fake activity and shapes its level of transparency because there are no legally binding reporting rules on disinformation.)
Legally binding rules on handling online disinformation aren’t in the EU’s pipeline either — but commissioners said today that they wanted a beefed-up and “more binding” code. They have some levers to pull here via a wider package ofthrough the EU’s co-legislative process (aka the Digital Services Act). The DSA will bring legally binding rules for how platforms handle illegal content. And the Commission intends its tougher disinformation code to plug into that (in the form of what they call a “co-regulatory backstop”). It still won’t be legally binding, but it may willing platforms extra DSA compliance “cred”. So it looks like disinformation-muck-spreaders’ arms are set to be twisted in a pincer regulatory move by the EU to ensure this stuff is loose, as an adjunct, to the legally binding regulation.
At the same time, Brussels maintains that it does not want to legislate around disinformation. The risks of taking a centralized approach might smell like censorship — and it sounds keen to avoid that charge at all costs. The digital regulation packages the EU has put forward since the 2019 college took up its mandate are generally aimed at increasing transparency,, its values and transparency commissioner, Vera Jourova, said today. Breton also said that now is the “right time” to deepen obligations under the disinformation code — with the DSA incoming — and give the platforms time to adapt (and involve themselves in responsibilities).
In another interesting remark, Breton also talked about regulatorsto “be able to audit platforms” — to be able to “check what is happening with the algorithms that push these practices”. Though quite how audit powers can be made to fit with a voluntary, non-legally binding code remains to be seen. Discussing areas where the current code has fallen short, Jourova pointed to application inconsistencies and languages. She also said the Commission is keen for the beefed-up code to do more to empower users to act when they see something dodgy online — such as by providing users with tools to flag problem content. Platforms should also provide disinformation content takedowns (to avoid the risk of opinions being incorrectly removed), she said.
The focus for the code would be on tackling false “facts, not opinions”, she emphasized, saying the Commission wants platforms to “embed fact-checking into their systems” — and for the code to work toward a “decentralized care of facts”. She said the current signatories to the code hadn’t provided external researchers with the kind of the Commission would like to see — to support greater transparency into (and accountability around) the disinformation problem. The code requires monthly (for COVID-19 disinformation), six-monthly, or yearly reports from signatories (depending on the entity’s size). But what’s been provided so far doesn’t add to a comprehensive picture of disinformation activity and platform reaction.
She also warned that online manipulation tactics are fast evolving and highly innovative — while also saying the Commission would like to see signatories agree on a set of identifiable “problematic techniques” to help speed up responses. He also said the Commission’s anti-disinformation efforts would focus on support for education to help equip EU citizens with the necessary critical thinking capabilities to navigate the huge quantities (of variable quality) information that surrounds them.